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TAGS: [KISL](#) [KDEM](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [OPDC](#) [UV](#)
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE "DEFAMATION
OF RELIGION" MOTION.

REF: SECSTATE 128320

Classified By: CDA Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

11. (C) Burkina Faso has regularly abstained on "Defamation of Religion" votes. It will be a challenge to get Burkina Faso to change its position to align more closely with ours and will require direct interventions with President Compaore. Burkina Faso's membership in the OIC and the fact that it is a Muslim majority country with a largely Christian leadership are factors that will need to be overcome. END SUMMARY.

Burkina Faso's Voting Record and the Way Forward

12. (U) Burkina Faso abstained from voting in the November 2009 motion on Combating Defamation of Religion. The abstention posture is one that Burkina Faso also adopted for three other major the human rights votes concerning North Korea, Burma and Iran.

13. (C) It will be a challenge to get Burkina Faso to change its position to align more closely with ours. In Burkina Faso, where power is highly centralized and controlled, only the President has the capacity to direct votes or change the current course of action in favor of alignment with the U.S. Nobody else will have sufficient traction to address this issue nor will they be able influence the vote.

14. (C) In our opinion, a two pronged approach is the best way to convince the leadership to contemplate changing its "consensual position" of abstention. First, the issue should be raised with the President. The Ambassador or Charge could, on instructions from Washington, meet President Compaore to broach the issue, contextualize the debate, and explain that backing a U.S initiative at the UN Human Rights Council would be more productive than either abstaining of voting for the motion.

15. (C) The second step would consist in either setting up a high level phone conversation between Compaore and A/S Carson or the Secretary or in raising the issue during a face-to- face meeting to personalize the request and further stress the importance of the message. A personal call or meeting would go a long way to making Compaore feel courted and consulted and may drive home the importance of this issue for the U.S. Appealing to Compaore's stature as regional mediator and elder statesman, explaining that other neighboring countries are watching, and perhaps looking to Burkina Faso's leadership for guidance, may also be a path worth exploring.

The Obstacles are Formidable

16. (C) Burkina Faso is a member of the OIC, the very organization at the forefront of this debate. While not a leader in the organization, Burkina Faso usually follows the OIC lead on issues that have no immediate repercussions or that are benign enough to Burkina Faso. The very fact that Burkina Faso has abstained from votes on the defamation of religion proposal is indicative of its desire to please the United States, while mitigating the reaction from the OIC - abstention is the middle ground, the "safe" choice for Burkina Faso.

17. (U) Burkina Faso is also a country which prides itself on religious tolerance. Burkina Faso is composed of 60 percent Muslims (mostly Sunni branch and to a lesser degree Shi'a, Tijaniyah or Salafi), 17 percent Christians (mainly Roman Catholics) . The President is not eager to undertake actions that might be considered hostile by Muslim voters, and getting him to go against positions supported by the international Muslim community will always be difficult. If, however, we are successful in demonstrating to other Muslim countries and leaders that our way of providing protection of the freedom of religion has more to offer, it will be considerably easier to bring Compaore along.
LAEUCHLI